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RECENT CASES
ity view of the state's lawyers with respect to legislation af-
fecting the administration of justice and the practice of law.
GEORGE R. LAWRENCE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-RULES OF
EVIDENCE--ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE-
Defendant's home was forcibly entered by several police offi-
cers who conducted a complete search of the home without a
search warrant. The defendant was convicted of having in her
possession obscene materials' which were discovered in the
illegal search. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the validity
of the conviction.- Upon appeal the United States Supreme
Court held, three justices dissenting, that evidence obtained
by unconstitutional search was inadmissible in state prosecu-
tion. Thus conviction was vitiated under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the landmark case of Wolf v. Colorado'
which had stood inviolate for 12 years was overruled.
The dissent maintained that the majority in overruling
Wolf, instead of passing upon the-constitutionality of section
2905.34 of the Ohio Revised Code, chose the more difficult
and less appropriate of the two constitutional questions in-
volved. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Illegally seized evidence, formerly admissible in state
courts, has now been declared inadmissible because of its un-
constitutional nature. The first specific reference made to
evidence as being unconstitutional arose in Boyd v. United
States in 1886.' In 1914 the Supreme Court adopted the fed-
eral exclusionary rule' with respect to evidence illegally ob-
tained. The Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado' 1949 declared
that the right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment was
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However the court decided
that the Weeks exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon
1. Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.34 (1953) provides in part that "no lerson
shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control an ob-
scene, lewd, or lascivious book . . . (or) picture..."
2. State v. Mapp. 170 Ohio St. 427, 430, 166 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1960). The
Supreme Court of Ohio found that her conviction was valid though "based
primarily upon the Introduction in evidence of books and pictures unlaw-
fully seized during an unlawful search of defendant's home."
3. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Claimant was compelled to produce an incrim-
inatory invoice upon which conviction was based-held, unconstitutional as
being within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.5. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In a federal prosecution
the fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an ille-
gal search and seizure. The Weeks rule is codified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). 6. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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the states as "an essential ingredient of that right'" unless.
the conduct were so brutal as to shock the public conscience.!
The basis for the development of the federal exclusionary
rule is two-fold. It has a deterring effect upon officials dis-
patched to invade individual privacy and it prevents the judi-
ciary from being employed as an instrument for the lawless
enforcement of the criminal law.'
Some limitations to the exclusionary rule which appear
likely to continue in effect are: The illegal search and seizure
must constitute an injury against the defendant or his prop-
erty ° without his consent;" a defendant who voluntarily testi-
fies and admits possession or ownership of the articles seized
can no longer object to their introduction on the ground that
they have been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure;
a motion to suppress evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure must be timely asserted."
The decision reached in this case will require a great deal of
legislation or judicial alignment. Prior to the instant case, 29
states" had adopted, some by decision" and some by statute"
or constitutional amendment,' the federal exclusionary rule.
North Dakota"' together with some 20 other states has follow-
7. Id. at 29.
8. Rochin v. California, 343 U.S. 165, 175 (1952).
9. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
10. Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1933).
11. Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1937).
12. State v. Park, 322 Mo. 69, 16 S.W.2d 30 (1929); Burks v. State, 194
Tenn. 675, 254 S.W.2d 970 (1953).
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
14. 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaugton rev. 1961). 20 states
have adopted the federal exclusionary rule with no significant exceptions;
Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington. West Virginia and Wyoming. 9
other states have adopted the rule with various exceptions; Alabama, Mary-
land, Michigan, Nevada, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota
and Wisconsin.
15. State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924)
(illegal search warrant; evidence so obtained excluded); Ledbetter v. State,
185 Tenn. 619, 207 S.W.2d 336 (1948) (conviction based on illegally obtained
evidence reversed).
16. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 727 (a) (2 Vernon's Statutes 434 1948). No
evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any pro-
visions of the Constitution or law of the State of Texas, or of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against
the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
17. Mich. Comp. L. art. 2 § 10 (1948). "The person, houses, papers, and
possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things
shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation: Provided, however, that the provisions of this sec-
tion shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any court of criminaljurisdiction, or in any criminal proceeding held before any magistrate orjustice of the peace, any firearm, rifle, pistol, revolver, automatic pistol,
machine gun, bomb, bomb shell, explosive, blackjack, slungshot, billy,
metallic knuckles, gas-ejecting device, or any other dangerous weapon or
thing, seized by any peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling
house in this state."
18. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925) (evidence seized under
an invalid warrant admitted); see State v. Pauley, 49 N.D. 488, 192 N.W. 91(1923) (search without a warrant; evidence so obtained admitted).
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ed the common-law rule of admissibility of illegally seized evi-
dence.
It is the writer's belief that a rule somewhat more flexible
than that which is stated in the principal case should be
adopted. In determining whether illegally obtained evidence
should be admissible, an individual's constitutional right of
privacy should be weighed against the protection of society
against crime. The courts should then have the freedom to
protect that interest which would suffer the greater harm.
Despite the writer's views, it appears that North Dakota
would best serve the interests of uniformity if the legislature
were to formally adopt the federal exclusionary rule.
DENNIS L. THOMTE
DAMAGES-MENTAL SUFFERING-RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR
MENTAL ANGUISH CAUSED BY BREACH OF CONTRACT-Plaintiff,
a recently married woman, brought this action for damages
resulting from defendant's failure to deliver a gown and a veil
in time for her wedding and also for her mental anguish,
humiliation, and embarrassment. In reversing judgment for
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, three
judges dissenting, that the plaintiff could not recover for
mental anguish, humiliation, and embarrassment in the ab-
sence of physical injury. Seidenbach's Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.
2d (Okla. 1961).
It has been said that damages for mental anguish have been
awarded in two classes of cases.1 The first class proceeding on
a tort theory is where both anguish and bodily injury result.2
The second class of cases allows recovery for mental anguish
which was caused by an infraction of a legal right though
physical injury is nonexistent.' A further restriction enunciat-
ed is that the infraction must be wilful or malicious.! The act
or omission causing mental disturbance may be tortious or
from a breach of contract. The carrier' and innkeeper' cases
are good examples of businesses which can be made defend-
1. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1076 (1951).
2. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930);
Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac. 597
(1916).
3. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 310, 50 N.W. 239 (1891).
4. Beaulieu v. Great Northern R. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907)
(dictum); Texas and P. R. Co. v. Gott, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 235, 50 S.W. 193(1899) (dictum); Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N.W. 356 (1882)
(dictum).
5. Beaulieu v. Great Northern R. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907).
6. Boyce v. Greeley Sq. Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920)
(dictum); DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908) (dictum).
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